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Essay
Never Get Out'a the Boat
Stenberg v. Carhartand the Future of American Law
JOHN M. BREEN* & MICHAEL A. SCAPERLANDAt

Francis Ford Coppola's Apocalypse Now' is a powerful film full of
many gripping scenes. Since its release in 1979, the movie has provided
viewers not only with haunting images of the Vietnam War, but also with a
story that has a great deal to say about human nature and the nature of
violent conflict. In its own way, the Supreme Court's opinion in Stenberg
v. Carharttells an equally gripping story.2 Unfortunately, the case is not a
work of fiction, but a declaration of what our Constitution demands.
Moreover, unlike Coppola's graphic depiction of war, the majority's
depiction of partial birth abortion in Stenberg is deliberately understated.
Despite these apparent dissimilarities, the movie-and one scene in
particular-serves as a poignant commentary on Stenberg and, by
extension, the future of American law.
Apocalypse Now is largely based on Joseph Conrad's short novel,
Heart of Darkness.3 In the film, Martin Sheen plays Captain Benjamin
Willard, a Special Forces officer ordered to assassinate Colonel Walter
Kurtz, a renegade American played by Marlon Brando. Confronting the
Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
Gene and Elaine Edwards Family Chair and Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
The authors wish to thank Richard W. Garnett, Robert P. George, Mary Ann Glendon, Paul J. Griffiths,
F. Russell Hittinger, Thomas Levergood, Robert Royal, Richard Stith, Lee J. Strang and George

Weigel, and for their support and encouragement, and for reading prior drafts of this essay.
1 APOCALYPSE Now (Zoetrope Studios 1979).
2 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).

3 JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS (1902).
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brutal truth of their command-the murder of a fellow American soldierrequires an honesty that Willard's superiors cannot muster. Thus, they do
not directly tell Willard to "kill Colonel Kurtz." Instead, in the sanitized
jargon of military operations, Willard is ordered to "terminate the
Colonel's command." Indeed, the CIA case worker present at Willard's
briefing tells him "Terminate with extreme prejudice."
To find Kurtz and carry out his mission, Willard is ferried up the Nung
River to Cambodia on a Navy Swift boat manned by a crew of four. At
one point on their journey, the men stop the boat and rest for a while along
the river bank. "Chef," a cook who serves as the boat's machinist, goes
into the jungle in search of mangoes, accompanied by Willard. As they
make their way into the bush, Chef explains how a man trained as a
saucier6 in New Orleans came to work as a machinist. Their friendly
banter suddenly ends, however, as Willard hears something, tenses up and
moves forward, pointing his M-16 in the direction of the sound. Willard's
quiet intensity frightens Chef. It might be "Charlie" lurking in the bush,
waiting to ambush them. They stop, pause, a shadow moves, and a tiger
bounds out of the jungle. The two men fire their weapons and Chef yells
in terror as they run back to the boat. They jump on board and the boat
races away, firing its guns into the jungle. Overwhelmed by the incident,
Chef becomes hysterical. Not only must the men contend with the
constant threat of death by the Viet Cong, but as Chef exclaims "I almost
got eaten by a fucking tiger!" He screams at the top of his lungs, "Never
get out'a the fucking boat! I gotta remember, never get out'a the fucking
boat!" In a voice-over, Willard-a man trained in the art of killing, a man
who knows the jungle-expresses his agreement: "Never get out'a the
boat. Absolutely god damn right... Unless you were going all the way."
In this scene, the boat and the jungle are not only places where the
drama unfolds. They also function as metaphors for, respectively, a
society in which human conduct is bound by the limits of moral restraint,
and a place which has no such limitations. That is, not unlike the Pequod
in Melville's Moby Dick,4 the patrol boat in Apocalypse Now represents
civilization. Compared to the near-total insanity and chaos of the wider
conflict around them, the boat offers its crew and passenger a place of
relative safety. On the boat the men eat and sleep and smoke together.
They answer their mail and brush their teeth. Although the strictures of
military discipline are somewhat lax, on the boat the men can protect
themselves from the dangers of a hostile world. Indeed, in maintaining the
rationality and order necessary to survive "the shit" of Vietnam, the
boatmates share a common fate.
4 HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK; OR THE WHALE (1851).
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To get off the boat is to abandon civilization and with it the moral
order that makes social life possible. To get off the boat and venture into
the jungle is to leave behind the norms of civil society and enter a place
where violence is neither right or wrong, only "necessary." It is a place
beyond good and evil, where freedom knows no bounds. Without the
constraints and security provided by social custom and the protection
afforded by law, one must be willing to suspend one's moral judgment and
go "all the way." That is, one must have the will to do what others cannot
bring themselves to do. One must have the strength to act like the Viet
Cong who, as Kurtz later recounts, hacked off the little arms of all the
children in a village simply because the Americans had inoculated them
against polio. A man who gets off the boat and ventures into the jungle
must, as Kurtz says, be able "to kill without feeling, without passion,
without judgment, without judgment, because it is judgment that defeats
us." No longer encumbered by the moral judgments of civilization, which
temper the exercise of individual will, one is free to act in any way deemed
desirable.
"Never get out'a the fucking boat." Sound advice, not only for Swift
boat grunts tempted to venture out into the jungle, but also for federal
judges and elected officials, indeed, for anyone who hopes to live in a
society in which the dignity of the human person is respected and ordered
liberty is preserved.
In Stenberg v. Carhart,the Supreme Court "got out'a the fucking boat"
and showed that it was willing to go "all the way." All the way to
declaring that the State may not protect a child in the process of being
born. 5 All the way to saying that what is indisputably a human being does
5 See

Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 290 (2d Cir. 2006) (Walker, C.J.,

concurring) (stating that the Stenberg Court, "effectively held that the deeply disturbing--and morally
offensive-destruction of the life of a partially bom child cannot be banned by a legislature without an
exception for the mother's health (as determined by her doctor)"); id. at 312 (Straub, J., dissenting) ("I
find the current expansion of the right to terminate a pregnancy to cover a child in the process of being
bom morally, ethically, and legally unacceptable."); James Bopp, Jr. & Curtis R. Cook, PartialBirth
Abortion: The Final Frontierof Abortion Jurisprudence,14 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 4 (1998) ( "Partial-

birth abortion is the final frontier of abortion jurisprudence because it involves the killing of the child
during birth."). The Court in Stenberg noted that:
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists describes the D&X
procedure [(partial-birth abortion)] in a manner corresponding to a breechconversion intact D&E [(dilation and evacuation)], including the following steps:
"L.deliberate dilatation of the cervix, usually over a sequence of days;

2. instrumental conversion of the fetus to a footling breech;
3. breech extraction of the body excepting the head; and

4. partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of a living fetus to effect
vaginal delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus."
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 928 (citing the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Executive

Board, Statement on Intact Dilation and Extraction (Jan. 12, 1997)).
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not, under the Constitution, enjoy the benefit of law.6 All the way to the
brink of infanticide.7
Of course, the Supreme Court does not say this directly. Because the
majority recognizes the sheer barbarism of what they say the Constitution
* 8
requires,
they are unwilling to express themselves with genuine candor.
Instead, like Captain Willard's superiors, the Stenberg court articulates its
decision in language that conceals the true nature of the conduct involved,
making it morally palatable to those who like to think of themselves as
members of civilized society. But all of this is subterfuge. Behind the
cloak of polite verbiage Willard's superiors are ordering him to kill Kurtz
6 See generally Kathleen A. Cassidy Goodman, The Mutation of Choice, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 635,
661 (1997) ("Partial-birth abortion must be viewed not only as a morally questionable practice in the
already controversial realm of abortion, but also as an indicator of the direction the United States is
moving with regard to respect for all human life."); Stephanie D. Schmutz, Infanticide or Civil Rights
for Women: Did the Supreme Court Go Too Far in Stenberg v. Carhart?, 39 Hous. L. REv. 529, 531
(2002) ("The gruesome detail with which this law describes the procedure it restricts indicates just how
far we have denigrated the rights of unborn children.").
7 Some have argued that partial birth abortion should not fall within the Court's abortion
jurisprudence since it involves the killing of a partially-birthed human baby, that is, infanticide. See,
e.g., Bopp & Cook, supra note 5, at 32 ("The partial-birth extraction and cranial decompression
procedure constitutes infanticide and is not governed by abortion jurisprudence."). Indeed, according
to this analysis:
the abortion right applies only to those who are unborn. A baby who is partially
delivered cannot properly be termed unborn. In the partial-birth abortion procedure
as described by practitioners, the baby is three-fourths delivered. Only three inches
of the baby could arguably be said to be unborn. The baby as a whole is partiallyborn, not unborn. As a result, abortion jurisprudence does not apply to a partially
delivered child.
Id. at 26. See also Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 437 F.3d at 312 (Straub, J., dissenting) ("In addition to
vindicating the right to life of those in the process of being born, the State has a compelling interest in
protecting the line between abortion and infanticide."); Steven Grasz, If Standing Bear Could Talk...
Why There is No Constitutional Right to Kill a Partially-Born Human Being, 33 CREIGHToN L. REV.
23, 26 (1999) (arguing that "partial-birth abortion cases can, and should, be decided outside the legal
framework of Roe and its progeny"); Jill R. Radloff, Partial-Birth Infanticide: An Alternate Legal and
Medical Route to Banning Partial-Birth Procedures,83 MINN. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (1999) (arguing that
partial-birth infanticide is an accurate description of what is commonly called partial-birth abortion
because "the child dies during the birth process"). But see Eric Johnson, Habit and Discernment in
Abortion Practice: The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as Morals Legislation, 36 RUTGERS
L.J. 549, 605 (2005) (arguing that although "it is true that to the layperson dilation and extraction bears
a close resemblance to infanticide ... physicians need not and probably will not perceive dilation and
extraction as closely resembling infanticide, [therefore] there is no good reason to suppose that their
use of this technique ultimately will prevent them from acquiring or maintaining a habit of respect for
persons").
8 See, e.g., Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Although much ink is spilled
today describing the gruesome nature of late-term abortion procedures, that rhetoric does not provide
me a reason to believe that the procedure Nebraska here claims it seeks to ban is more brutal, more
gruesome, or less respectful of 'potential life' than" many other abortion methods."). The ink spilled to
which Justice Stevens refers appears in the Stenberg dissents. As noted above, Justice Breyer's
majority opinion employs the restrained language of clinical medical texts. In other areas of practice,
this technical verbiage provides a uniform way of referring to the subject of a medical procedure and
the actions performed with respect to it. Here, however, this language not only serves the purpose of
standardization, but of concealing the horror of the procedure it describes precisely in order to
legitimize it.

HeinOnline -- 39 Conn. L. Rev. 300 2006-2007

2006]

NEVER GET OUT'A THE BOAT

by any means necessary, and the Supreme Court is declaring that the
Constitution forbids the States from banning a practice in which a child,
who is within inches of being fully born, can have its skull split open by a
pair of scissors and its brains sucked out by a vacuum.
At the beginning of his majority opinion in Stenberg, Justice Stephen
Breyer notes that the act of abortion can be described in disparate ways.
He acknowledges that some people believe that the abortion license is
necessary to ensure the "equal liberty" of American women, while others
hold that "an abortion is akin to causing the death of an innocent child." 9
Even here, however, Breyer finds it difficult to state the pro-life position in
unvarnished form. Opponents of abortion do not believe that the act is
merely akin to causing the death of an innocent child but that it is the
deliberate and intentional killing of an innocent child. Regardless of the
specific articulation, it seems that for Breyer such description is merely
rhetorical gloss. He gives no indication that there is any truth beyond the
political preference for or against abortion that would support or refute
9Id.at 920. The Second Circuit recently echoed Breyer's observation regarding the disparate
views held concerning abortion. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 437 F.3d at 281 ("Some consider abortion the
illegitimate killing of a person. Others consider abortion a legitimate medical procedure used by a
pregnant woman, in consultation with her doctor, to terminate a pregnancy prior to birth. Those on
both sides of the controversy acknowledge that the fetus is a living organism, starting as a collection of
cells just after conception and developing into a recognizable human form as the time for birth
approaches. The destruction of a fetus is a distressing event, whether one views abortion as the killing
of a person or a pregnant woman's personal choice concerning her body.").
Justice Breyer considers these views "virtually irreconcilable." Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 920. If by
this he means that each side in the abortion debate has strongly held views and that neither side is likely
to alter its perspective, he may well be right. As a logical matter, however, the two views are not
mutually exclusive. That is, it may well be the case both that the abortion license gives women greater
freedom to direct their lives than they would have if it was not available and that the abortion
procedure causes the death of an innocent child. There is no formal contradiction in these two claims.
By contrast, those who once held that the earth was flat and those who held that the earth was
round held mutually-exclusive views. The law of the excluded middle precludes the possibility of the
earth being both round and flat in the same way at the same time. But those who held that the South
needed slavery to compete on equal footing with the North and those who believed in the dignity of all
persons, including enslaved African-Americans, did not hold "virtually irreconcilable" views. In the
first case, the flat earther's were proved wrong. In the second case, regardless of whether the claim
concerning regional economic equality was true or false, the United States decided to subordinate this
claim in favor of the liberty claim.
In the abortion context, social critic Naomi Wolf demonstrates how Breyer's "virtually
irreconcilable" positions can be reconciled by subordinating the life of the unborn child in favor of
women's equality. She calls for pro-choice advocates to stop "entangl[ing] our beliefs in a series of
self-delusions, fibs and evasions." Naomi Wolf, Our Bodies, Our Souls, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 16,
1995, at 26, availableat LEXIS, News Library, NEWRPG File. Part of this "radical shift in the prochoice movement's rhetoric" requires "contextualiz[ing] the fight to defend abortion rights within a
moral framework that admits that the death of a fetus is a real death." Id. For Wolf, "[flree women
must be strong women, too; and strong women, presumably, do not seek to cloak their most important
decisions in euphemism." Id. at 32. Instead, the exercise of power must be accompanied by an honest
recognition of what that power accomplishes. Thus, although she maintains "that a woman's equality
in society must give her some irreducible rights unique to her biology, including the right to take the
life within her," she insists that "we don't have to lie to ourselves about what we are doing at such a
moment." Id.
at 33.
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such a description. ° There is only the "truth" constructed by the Court
according to which abortion is a constitutional right, a right that the Court
"has determined and then redetermined" in the course of a generation,"
first in Roe v. Wade12 and later in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.'3 Thus, in giving constitutional sanction to partial
birth abortion, the Stenberg court does not bother to deny that the subject
of this gruesome procedure is in fact a human life, a human being, a child
in the process of being born. Indeed the unspoken premise upon which the
Stenberg decision turns is that the humanity or inhumanity of the entity
aborted is irrelevant to the constitutionality of the act.' 4 Apparently, like
Willard's commanders, Breyer believes that some things are better left
unsaid.' 5
Unable to make the argument that a healthy six, seven, eight, or ninemonth-old fetus subject to partial birth abortion is not a human being, the
Court likewise finds itself unable to tell the American public that the
question of the fetus' humanity is irrelevant to the issue of whether or not
the State may ban the procedure. Instead, the Court avoids the
embarrassment of such a failed argument by ignoring the issue altogether.
In doing so, it employs a strategy reserved for those privileged institutions
that have the final say with respect to a given matter. As Justice Robert
Jackson famously observed, the members of the Court "are not final
10Cf. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV. 668, 673
(1984) (arguing that the Roe court "felt free to impose its own notions of reality" such that "the
biological reality" of the developing child in the womb "could be subordinated or ignored by the
sovereign speaking through the Court").

" Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 921.
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
14See Michael W. McConnell, How Not to Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1198 (1991) (book review) (arguing that in claiming that it need not resolve the
difficult question of when life begins, the Roe court "was suggesting that the question of human life
was irrelevant to the decision").
15 Paradoxically, the fact that the Court, like Willard's commanders, is unwilling to speak the
truth aloud is itself a sign of hope. If the Court had been confident in the absence of moral objection to
its ruling, if it had thought that barbarism was now widely accepted, then there would have been no
need for it to fail to admit the fact that a partially delivered baby is indeed a human person. Deep in the
jungle, the Court could openly acknowledge the child's humanity and still license others "to kill ...
without judgment, without judgment, because it is judgment that defeats us." At the edge of the jungle,
where the end of civilization and the beginning of barbarism blur together, the Court must still act in a
strategic fashion, and so be sparing in its use of candor.
In 1970, the California Medical Association predicted the need for precisely this strategy in order
to secure wide-spread acceptance of the abortion license. In an editorial in its magazine, the
Association argued that "semantic gymnastics" would need to be employed to avoid "the scientific
fact, which everyone already knows, that human life begins at conception and is continuous whether
intra or extra uterine until death." Editorial, A New Ethicfor Medicine and Society, CAL. MED., 67, 68
(1970). The medical profession, it said, must deny what the editorial referred to as the "intrinsic and
equal value for every human life regardless of its stage, condition or status" until such time as society
would accept abortion without judgment. Id.Such obfuscation would, it said, be necessary to effect a
mental disconnection, "to separate the idea of abortion from the idea of killing." Id.
12 Roe
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because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final. '16
The Stenberg decision not only manifests the Court's fallibility, 7 but also
exposes the folly of any institution that would hope to resolve such a
sensitive and divisive issue without having "the courage
to look the truth in
8
the eye and to call things by their propername.'
Unfortunately, the Court does more than fail to call things by their
proper name. Like Willard's commanders, the Stenberg majority hides
behind a rhetoric which is intended to strike the reader as neutral and
unobjectionable. Indeed, the Court claims that "[t]here is no alternative
way," that such language is necessary "to acquaint the reader with the
technical distinctions among different abortion methods and related factual
matters."' 9 Thus, the Court is able to describe an innocuous medical
procedure in which "the doctor pulls the fetal body through the cervix,
collapses the skull, and extracts the fetus through the cervix., 2 ° Clearly,
the humanity of the victim of this procedure is not among the "factual
matters" addressed by the Court. By not judging the matter, the Court
hopes to finally resolve it.
As such, Kurtz's prescription for victory in war aptly describes the
Court's decision in the case. Indeed, it is an epithet for the morbid
liberalism that currently defines the Court's jurisprudence. In Stenberg the
Court takes decisive action, but "without judgment, without judgment,
because it is judgment that defeats us." The Court does not pause to
consider the status of the child struggling to be born, victimized by the
procedure it approves. Without judgment the Court is free to act. The
irony cannot help but appeal to post-modem sensibilities. By not judging,
the judges judge in favor of a virulent tolerance. Put another way, the
majority has decided that in order to preserve the liberty that defines
American civilization, the law must ensure that women are free2 to act with
extreme prejudice toward children in the process of being born. '
16 Brown

v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).

17 On the potential fallibility of a court vested with final authority, see Jack Wade Nowlin,
Constitutional Violations by the UnitedStates Supreme Court:Analytical Foundations,2005 U. ILL. L.

REv. 1123, 1196 (2005) (arguing that "the concept of constitutional violations by the Supreme Court
has significant support as a matter of analytic jurisprudence and constitutional analysis"). For an
argument questioning the finality or supremacy of Supreme Court decisions, see Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest
ProposalsFrom the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB. L. REv. 671, 691 (1995) (arguing that "[i]t
is time
to explode the myth of judicial supremacy and judicial exclusivity in constitutional interpretation-a
myth that has lived long but ought not be allowed to prosper").
18 POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER, Evangelium Vitae 58 (1995), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/john_paulii/encyclicals/documents/hf jp-ii enc 25031995
evangelium-vitae en.html.
19Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923 (2000).
20
Id at 927.
21 In this logic, those with an ear attuned to history may hear faintly in the background the voice
of an American commander in Vietnam who, following the annihilation of the village of Ben Tre
famously remarked that "It became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it." Adam Clymer,
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The absence of judgment in Stenberg has been replicated by virtually
every federal court to consider a subsequent state restriction on partial birth
abortion.2 2 Indeed, the nearly lockstep fashion in which federal courts
have struck down these statutes shows that, notwithstanding all their
vaunted independence, judges with life tenure no less than soldiers can
follow the orders of their superiors without question, without judgment.
Of course, some might argue that curtailing, if not entirely eliminating, the
judgment of lower courts is precisely the point of stare decisis. Respect
for established precedent and settled legal principle guarantees continuity
and thus stability in the legal system in much the same way that the chain
of command prevents enlisted men and officers of lower rank from secondguessing the military plans formulated by their superiors. Still, as
important as the chain of command is, it cannot excuse or legitimate acts of
barbarism. 23 It cannot prevent even the lowliest front-line conscript from
recognizing the humanity of a non-combatant and refusing to obey an
order that directly targets innocent human life.24
Even in times of war, civilization is not without its defenders. In 2003,
Congress passed and President Bush signed a federal ban on partial birth
abortion. 2p The statute was immediately challenged by advocates of the
House Revolutionary, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1992, at 41, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
See also GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM 19501975 (2d ed. 1986) ("The oflhand remark of a U.S. Army officer who had participated in the liberation
of the village of Ben Tre-'We had to destroy the town to save it'---seemed to epitomize the
purposeless destruction of the war.").
22 See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2005) (striking
down a Virginia statute); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2001) (striking down an Illinois
statute); R.I. Med. Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 239 F.3d 104 (lst Cir. 2001) (striking down a Rhode Island
statute); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000) (striking down a
New Jersey statute). The sole exception has been Women's Med. Prof. Corp. v. TaP, 353 F.3d 436
(6th Cir. 2003) (upholding an Ohio statute). Of the nine Circuit Court judges to consider the
constitutionality of the federal ban on partial-birth abortion, one dissented from the conclusion that the
statute is unconstitutional in light of Stenberg. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278,
296 (2d Cir. 2006) (Staub, J., dissenting).
23 How a lower court judge should resolve the conflict between his or her duty as a judge to apply
the positive law and his or her duty as a human being to refrain from participation in acts of barbarism
is beyond the scope of this essay. For a thoughtful essay on a related though somewhat more narrow
topic, see John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303
(1998) (arguing that faithful Catholic judges may not sentence even a rightfully convicted criminal to
death).
24 The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that any soldier who acts "with intent to usurp
or override lawful military authority, refuses, in concert with any other person, to obey orders or
otherwise do his duty or creates any violence or disturbance is guilty of mutiny." 10 U.S.C. § 894
(2000). A soldier may, however, disobey an order by his or her superior to murder non-combatants
because such an order would not be made with "lawful military authority." See Calley v. Callaway,
382 F. Supp. 650, 675 (1974) (quoting General Westmoreland who declared "that an unlawful order
from a superior does not excuse or justify one of our soldiers killing an innocent civilian").
25 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.A. §1531 (Supp. 2006). The statute
immediately generated a flood of commentary, much of it focused on the scope of the right to abortion
created by the Court in Roe and Casey. See Scott A. Hodges, Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: Beyond
the Bounds of Roe: Does Stenberg v. Carhart Invalidate the Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act of 2003?,
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procedure in three federal actions filed in New York, San Francisco and
Omaha. The district court in each of these lawsuits ruled that the federal
statute, like its state counterparts, violated the constitutional freedom set
forth in Stenberg.26 The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeal have in turn affirmed each of these respective decisions.27 To date,
every court to consider the matter found that the statute was deficient
because it lacked a "health" exception that would allow the procedure
where, in the language of Casey, it was deemed "necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother., 28 Although these words sound like words of limitation, from the
beginning of its abortion jurisprudence, the Court has given the term
"health" an exceedingly broad reading. Indeed, in Doe v. Bolton, the
companion case to Roe, the Court defined "health" to mean "all factorsand the woman's agephysical, emotional, psychological, familial,
29
relevant to the well-being of the patient."
It is this nearly boundless understanding of "health" coupled with a
woman's inviolable desire to obtain an abortion that allows the Court to go
"all the way." Indeed, it mandates the result in Stenberg. Thus, it is hard
to take issue with Justice Antonin Scalia's conclusion that Stenberg is not
"a regrettable misapplication of Casey" but the "logical and entirely
30
predictable consequence" of that decision.
57 OKLA. L. REv. 601 (2004) (arguing that the Act is constitutional); Melissa C. Holsinger, The
Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act of2003: The CongressionalReaction to Stenberg v. Carhart, 6 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 603 (2003) (arguing that the Act is unconstitutional); Tamara F. Kushnir,
Comment, It's My Body, It's My Choice: The Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act of 2003, 35 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 1117 (2004) (same). Others have suggested that the Act is unconstitutional on grounds of
federalism. See Allan Ides, The Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act of 2003 and the Commerce Clause, 20
CONST. COMMENT. 441, 443 (2003-2004) (arguing that the Act "is subject to serious doubt under
current commerce clause doctrine"); David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism
Seriously: Lopez and the Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REv. 59, 59 (1997) (stating that
"the argument for a congressional power to regulate abortion under the Interstate Commerce Clause
seems dubious at best"); Alissa Schecter, Choosing Balance: CongressionalPowers and the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (2005) (arguing that the Act is
unconstitutional on federalism grounds)
26 See Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft,
330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d
957 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
27 Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted,_ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006);
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. granted,Gonzales v. Carhart, __ U.S. _, 126
S. Ct. 1314 (2006).
28 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
29 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). For an extended discussion of the "health exception"
in the context of mental health, see Brian D. Wassom, Comment, The Exception that Swallowed the
Rule?: Women's Medical Professional Corporation v. Voinovich and the Mental Health Exception to
Post-Viability Abortion Bans, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 799 (1999).
30 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 954 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

HeinOnline -- 39 Conn. L. Rev. 305 2006-2007

CONNECTICUTLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 39:297

Notwithstanding the rhetoric of "health" and the Stenberg court's
calculated efforts to understate the sheer horror of what it approves, some
people can still read a map. Some people know when they've gone
overboard. Some people can look at their surroundings and know in an
instant that they have left civilization behind and are now heading deep
into the jungle. After reviewing all the evidence in the New York lawsuit
challenging the federal statute, District Judge Richard Casey concluded
that partial birth abortion,
"is a gruesome, brutal, barbaric, and uncivilized
31
medical procedure."
Recognition of this fact would cause most people to run out of the
jungle and climb back on board the boat as fast as they can. But "health"
gets in the way. Indeed, health as "well-being" makes the retreat back to
civilization exceedingly difficult. In the bizarre world created by Stenberg,
the Constitution demands that the state not interfere with the "gruesome,
brutal, barbaric, and uncivilized" acts that are "necessary" to kill a child in
the process of being born. After all, the emotional, psychological, or
familial "well-being" of a woman may dictate that she be able to choose
the method of her child's execution. She may wish to be reassured that her
baby will die quickly and without pain, or that her abortion will be
conducted in such as way as to eliminate the possibility of a live birth, or
simply in order to please the doctor whom she trusts, the doctor who
simply wants to avoid any "unnecessary complications." The point is that
"well-being" is broad enough to encompass all of these sorts of
considerations, as well as countless others. As such, "health" is no longer
firmly rooted in medical science. It is now a word that artfully conceals
the exercise of power "without judgment, without judgment."

Later in the film the boat and its crew make their way up the river and
Willard eventually locates Colonel Kurtz. He discovers, however, that
Kurtz is truly insane. As Willard remarks, "Kurtz got off the boat" and
"split from the whole fucking program." The rotting corpses and severed
heads that decorate Kurtz's compound testify to this fact. But it is not an
insanity derived from the absence of any rationality. Instead, Kurtz's
insanity is the result of subscribing to two contradictory rationalities
simultaneously. In the film, this contradiction is presented as the paradox
of war: to save civilization, man must abandon the moral limits of human
conduct and act with brutal savagery. For Coppola, however, this is no
paradox, only perverse absurdity. Indeed, the absurd way in which the war
is conducted is a recurring theme throughout the film: the Armed Forces
Radio tells nineteen-year-old GI's trained to kill that the mayor of Saigon
s' Nat 7 Abortion Fedn, 330 F. Supp. at 479.

HeinOnline -- 39 Conn. L. Rev. 306 2006-2007

2006]

NEVER GET OUT'A THE BOAT

wants them to hang their laundry up "indoors instead of off the window
sills" in order to "keep Saigon beautiful!"; military commanders fly three
Playboy centerfolds into the middle of the jungle to dance for the troops
and are surprised to find that the boys want to storm the stage; an Army
chaplain and a few soldiers celebrate mass on a smoke-filled landing zone
as a tank flame-thrower torches an enemy bunker; and one American
officer, obsessed with catching the perfect wave in Vietnam, has his
soldiers surf as enemy rounds explode around them.
Early in the film we are told that Kurtz was "a good man ...a
humanitarian man, a man of wit and humor." But it is this absurd
juxtaposition of civilization and war, of moral order and immoral violence,
of the desire to protect life and the utter disregard for life that drives Kurtz
insane. As Kurtz says moments before Willard kills him: "They train
young men to drop fire on people, but their commanders won't allow them
to write 'Fuck' on their airplanes because it's obscene!" For Kurtz the
contradiction is unbearable. It causes him to collapse from the inside. As
Willard puts it, Kurtz first broke from his superiors "and then he broke
from himself. I've never seen a man so broken up and ripped apart."
The law suffers a similar collapse when it embraces two contradictory
principles, two competing rationalities that cannot be reconciled with one
another. Stenberg constitutionalized this kind of insanity, injecting it into
our fundamental law by elevating an extreme conception of freedom above
the obligation to treat every human being as a subject deserving of equal
concern and respect.32 In doing so, the Court lifted human liberty to
unnatural heights while simultaneously destroying its foundation. Indeed,
the Court reasoned that to preserve the equal dignity of women in society it
is necessary to abandon the moral limits of human freedom. Respect for
women's autonomy requires that the state not intervene when a child in the
process of being born is met with brutal savagery. In both an immediate
and in an ultimate sense, however, the dignity and liberty of one individual
32 The

idea that the state must treat every individual as a subject of equal concern and respect is

foundational for many liberal legal theorists. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191-92
(1985) (arguing that liberalism takes "as its constitutive political morality" the idea "that government
must be neutral on what might be called the question of the good life"); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1977) (arguing that the state must treat people "with equal concern and
respect," meaning that it must not unequally distribute goods or opportunities to some because it
regards them as "worthy of more concern" nor may it "constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen's
conception of the good life ...is nobler or superior to another's"); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 3-4 (1971) (arguing that because "[e]ach person possesses an inviolability founded on justice"
that "in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice
are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests"); id.at 60 (describing the
first of two principles of justice as being that "each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others"). See also CHARLES E. LARMORE,
PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 59-68 (1987) (describing the importance of "equal respect" for
others as being "a respect for persons" that obligates one to engage in rational discussion with others
concerning matters in controversy).
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cannot rest firmly on the right to destroy another innocent human being.
Thus, by embracing an exaggerated understanding of human freedom, the
Court corrupted the very notion of equal dignity and respect and laid clear
the path into the jungle.
To be sure, liberty and equality are two principles, two rationalities
that must be embodied in law. Indeed, each of these principles constitutes
an indispensable aspect of human dignity such that each is necessary to
safeguard that dignity in the legal and political order. At the same time,
however, as commentators from Plato to de Tocqueville have observed,
liberty and equality stand somewhat in tension with one another.3 3 Taken
to an extreme, the principle of equality subverts liberty, and the principle
of liberty undermines equality. That is, if equality is not limited to formal
equality before the law, but is broadened to include equality of condition,
then individuals may no longer distinguish themselves through the free
exercise of their talents and resources. Similarly, unbounded liberty not
only exacerbates the natural differences that exist among individuals, but if
left unchecked, it renders even formal legal equality chimerical. The true
dignity of the human person instead requires a proper ordering, a kind of
equilibrium between these two competing principles.
Throughout most of our modem constitutional history, the Supreme
Court has preserved a balance between liberty and equality. The Court has
allowed Congress and the States to ensure some basic level of equality of
condition through the provision of public services and social insurance
benefits. In construing the meaning of equality under the Constitution,
however, the Supreme Court has not insisted on equality of condition or
equality of outcome.
Instead, the Court has largely limited its
interpretation to formal legal equality. This understanding of equality
requires public authorities to treat all individuals with equal concern and
respect simply by virtue of their status as human beings, and nothing
more. 34 Thus, in what is undoubtedly the modem Court's most celebrated

33 For a taste of the extensive literature exploring the real-world tension and theoretical
reconciliation of liberty and equality, see, e.g., John Attanasio, The Constitutionality of Regulating
Human Genetic Engineering: Where Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L.

REv.

1274 (1986); Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values,

Constraints,and Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary "Ownership Society,"

79 S. CAL. L. REv. 45 (2005); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976); Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One
View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PENN. L. REv. 962 (1973); Peter Shane, Compulsory
Education and the Tension Between Liberty and Equality: A Comment on Dworkin, 73 IOWA L. REV.
97 (1987).
3 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (striking down statute denying children born out of
wedlock the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother and asserting that "illegitimate
children are not 'non-persons.' They are humans, live, and have their being"). As noted below,
however, the principle of equal concern and respect does not require the state to treat all human beings
exactly alike in every respect. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding statute
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decision, Brown v. Board of Education, the Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government
from segregating children in public schools on the basis of race. 35 To do so
would violate their inherent dignity.36
Beyond the field of public education, this same concern for formal
legal equality has informed the Court's decisions in a variety of other
areas. These areas include the right to vote," the composition of civil
and
40
39
criminal juries,38 the right to marry and the disposition of property.
The duty to treat all human beings with equality, that is, as subjects
worthy of equal concern and respect, does not require the state to treat
every individual exactly alike in every way. Indeed, the state has "a wide
scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens
differently from others." 41 Rather, the state violates the principle of legal
equality when its classification of human beings "rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.4 2 Thus, for
example, the government may not deny admission to a state-sponsored
university on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or gender.43 It may,
however, restrict admission on the basis of perceived intelligence and
aptitude for study.44 By contrast, however, the government may not limit
or enhance an individual's right to free speech, or freedom of religion, or
due process based on perceived intelligence. Because they protect
fundamental aspects of human dignity, the state may not choose to
dispense these rights in any manner it sees fit and remain faithful to the
principle of equality. As a subject of equal concern and respect by virtue
forbidding illegitimate children from inheriting from their fathers by intestate succession even with
convincing proof of paternity following the father's death).
35Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
16 Id. at 494.
37Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
38 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42
(1992); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Talyor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
39Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Here, of course, the definition of marriage is limited to
one man and one woman. The Supreme Court has held that laws prohibiting polygamy are
constitutional. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164, 166 (1879) (upholding congressional
power to outlaw "actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order").
Obviously, the heterosexual nature of marriage has been subject to radical revision today by a number
of courts and legislatures. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)

(recognizing the right of same-sex couples to marry under the Massachusetts state constitution).
40 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (declaring unconstitutional an ordinance that treated
housing transactions on the basis of race); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (banning the
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants).
41McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
42 Id.

43United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
44 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding a racially neutral test for

governmental employees even though a greater proportion of African Americans failed the test).
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of his or her humanity, every human being is entitled to the enjoyment of
these rights.
Similarly, in construing the principle of liberty, as a general matter, the
Court has not viewed the law as an instrument of radical, individual
autonomy. Indeed, in setting forth the meaning of "freedom under law"
the Court has not been guided by the extreme view of liberty as license so
much as a concern for ordered liberty.45 Thus, although the Court has
typically interpreted the various individual rights granted under the
Constitution in a generous and expansive manner, the Court has also found
that these rights are subject to reasonable limitations required by the
common good.
For example, although the Court has found that a competent adult may
refuse to receive medical treatment,4 6 an individual may not decline to be
vaccinated against a communicable disease that poses a risk to the public
health. Parents have the right to raise their children and educate them as
they see fit,48 but this right of family autonomy does not include the right
to neglect children in their upbringing or engage in child abuse.49
Individuals have the right to freely practice the religion of their choice, and
the state may not question the truth of any particular theological tenet to
which they subscribe, but this freedom is not unbounded. 50 Likewise,
individuals may own, use, and dispose of property as they see fit, but the
government may control the use of property through zoning restrictions,
the provision of rights of access and environmental regulations, and the
designation of landmark status. 5' Indeed, an individual has no right to
restrictive covenant enforced by the state in a real estate
have a racially
52
transaction.
Even the right to free speech-perhaps the broadest and most
cherished liberty guaranteed by the Constitution-is limited by the
principle of harm to others. This harm may take the form of reputational,
psychological, or physical injury. Thus, for example, the state may,
consistent with the First Amendment, allow a private litigant to sue for
45 The phrase "ordered liberty," which has become a staple in American constitutional law,
originated in Palko v. Connecticut,302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
46Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
47Jacobson v. Massachusetts 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
48Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
49Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
50 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982). More recently, the principle that sincere
religious faith may be subject to the demands of the wider social order has been grossly distorted. See
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
5' Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104 (1978); Young v. Am. Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
52Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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damages for speech that constitutes libel.5 3 Likewise, the government may
ban the creation and distribution of child pornography, precisely because
of the severe harm inflicted on the children depicted in such materials.54
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the state may prohibit and punish
speech that is designed to incite violence against others. 5 That is,
notwithstanding the express constitutional guarantee of free speech, a state
may criminally punish advocacy speech that is intended to incite and likely
to produce "imminent lawless action, 56 as well as "fighting words"
directed toward a specific individual and likely to provoke a violent
response.57
There is no constitutional provision that expressly guarantees the right
to abortion,58 yet the Court has fashioned a right that far exceeds the
boundaries of the express guarantee of free speech. 59 Indeed, Stenberg
constitutionalized a right to violence, a right to harm another human being
in the most gruesome way imaginable.
In its First Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court permits the state to curtail speech because of the
state's even more basic interest in curtailing the possibility of violence.6 °
53See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v. Welch, 418
U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
54See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
5 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
56
Id. at 447.
37 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
58 In Roe, the Court forthrightly acknowledged that "[t]he Constitution does not explicitly
mention any right of privacy" and that the location of this right in the constitutional text is somewhat in
doubt. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (noting that the right may be "founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty" or in "the Ninth Amendment's reservation of
rights to the people"). Nevertheless, the Court held that such a right exists and that it "is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153. This tenuous
connection with the constitutional text has been a source of much criticism surrounding the decision.
See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Constitutional Theory and the Searchfor the Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 579, 583 (1983) ("Although rhetorically tied to the meaning of 'liberty' in the Fourteenth
amendment due process clause [sic), and loosely aligned with the penumbral analysis developed in
Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe cut fundamental rights adjudication loose from the constitutional text.").
With the passage of time, however, the Court has grown more confident in pinpointing the source of
this right. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) ("Constitutional
protection of the woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It declares that no State shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.' The controlling word in the cases before us is 'liberty."'). For a
defense of unenumerated rights as such and the right to an abortion in particular see generally
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 77-112 (1990); Ronald Dworkin,
UnenumeratedRights: Whether andHow Roe Should Be Overturned,59 U. CHI. L. REv. 381 (1992).
59 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech...."). Cf John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 935 (1973) (arguing that the liberty protected in Roe is accorded "a protection more stringent,
I think it is fair to say, than the present Court accords the freedom of the press explicitly guaranteed by
the First Amendment").
60 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also Daniel Kobil, Advocacy on
Line: Brandenburg v. Ohio and Speech in the Internet Era, 31 U. TOL. L. REv. 227, 237 (2000) ("The
Brandenburg test also works in a First Amendment sense for another reason. The test focuses
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The violence in partial birth abortion is no mere possibility. It is a deadly
certainty. Nevertheless, in Stenberg the Court held that the state may not
act to prevent the extermination of a human life, a human being, a child in
the process of being born, all in the name of freedom.
The Court is able to ignore this violence because, in the case of
abortion, it has abandoned the idea of ordered liberty in favor of a maximal
conception of human freedom. As the Court noted in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
"the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to
make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole
has important interests." 6 ' Yet this is precisely the kind of liberty-the
freedom to make one's own standards on matters of life and death, the
freedom to kill a child in the process of being born-that the Court
embraces in Stenberg. Although this understanding of freedom can be
found throughout the Court's abortion jurisprudence, it is most clearly
stated in Casey's now famous mystery passage: "At the heart of liberty is
the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life."62 Although much maligned
by those critical of the result in Casey, the passage is not without some
merit. A society that values freedom will not want its government to
supply all of the answers to life's questions. Indeed, a free society will,
within the bounds of ordered liberty, welcome a plurality of responses to
the question of value, the question of what kind of life is truly worth living.
At the same time, the freedom to define the "mystery of human life"
celebrated in Casey cannot include the facts of human life, and ordered
liberty does not require the government to remain silent and inactive with
respect to these facts. The scientific fact of when human life beginswhen a human life begins-has not been in doubt since the advent of the
modem study of human reproduction. 63 As Keith L. Moore succinctly
states in his standard medical text on embryology: "Development begins at
fertilization when a sperm fuses with an ovum to form a zygote. ... The
zygote is the first cell of a new human being.'6 4 This new human life
governmental law enforcement efforts on preventing harmful conduct rather than on the questionable
goal of limiting provocative speech.").
6 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
62 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
63 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and Law, 40 U.
PITT. L. REV. 359, 402-04 (1979) (summarizing the discoveries that lead to the development of modem
embryology in the early 19th century which, when "linked with the theory of cellular epigenesis,
provided support for the theory that a new being came into existence with the fertilization of the ovum,
and that this being thereafter developed without any change of its essential substance").
6' KEITH L. MOORE, BEFORE WE ARE BORN: BASIC EMBRYOLOGY AND BIRTH DEFECTS 23 (2d

ed. 1983). Because this point is not in dispute, numerous other standard medical texts setting forth the
same basic fact could be cited. A non-exhaustive list of such citations might include LESLIE BRAINERD
AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY: A TEXTBOOK AND LABORATORY MANUAL OF EMBRYOLOGY 55

(7th ed. 1974) ("The formation, maturation and meeting of a male and female sex cell are all
preliminary to their actual union into a combined cell, or zygote, which definitely marks the beginning
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exhibits a radical discontinuity with the gametes that joined to form it, and
with each of its parents. It is not a "part" of either its mother or its father.
Instead, it possesses the genetic constitution, functional integration and
material continuity of a distinct, new, human organism. Moreover, it will
manifest this identity, its identity, the identity of a human being throughout
each stage of its development as an embryo, fetus, infant, child, adolescent
and adult. These basic facts of biology were well-known in 1973 when
Roe was decided. 65 They were true then, and they remain true today.
Justice Harry Blackmun, the author of Roe, recognized that neither the
American public nor the logic of American law would accept an opinion
that, on the one hand, recognized the humanity of the unborn child and, on
the other hand, the right to kill such a human being.66 Because there was
of a new individual."); RONAN O'RAHILLY

& FAIOLA MULLER, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY AND

TERATOLOGY 8 (2d ed. 1996) ("Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark
because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby
formed.").
The possibility that the early embryo may subsequently divide complicates this matter somewhat.
Advocates of abortion and various forms of assisted reproduction contend that the possibility of
twinning precludes the recognition of the zygote as a human being. See Lawrence C. Becker, Human
Being: The Boundaries of the Concept, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 334, 340 (1975) (arguing that because one
cannot know how many human beings will develop from a given zygote, "[i]t surely will not do... to
say that the process of becoming a human being ends at conception"); John A. Robertson, In the
Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REv. 437, 445 (1990) (arguing that the
fertilized egg and early embryo "cannot seriously be considered a person or even a rights bearing
entity" since "[i]t lacks the neuromuscular requirements for cognition and sentience and is not even
individual until after implantation and further development occur"). This literature has significantly
expanded with the advent of embryonic stem cell research. For a balanced presentation of the opposing
views regarding the use of human embryos in stem cell research see THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICs, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN ETHICAL INQUIRY at ch. 6 (2002), available at
Even among those who oppose
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/fullreport.html.
abortion, the possibility of twinning is a source of disagreement concerning the moral and legal status
that should be accorded the embryo up until roughly the fourteenth day following fertilization when the
possibility of twinning no longer exists. Compare Charles E. Curran, Abortion: Law and Morality in
Contemporary Catholic Theology, 33 JURIST 162, 180 (1973) (opining that "individual human life is
not definitely established" before the process of twinning), and Paul Ramsey, Abortion: A Review
Article, 35 THOMIST 174, 188-94 (1973) (arguing that until the point of segmentation there only exists
the potentiality of human life), with GERMAIN GRISEz, ABORTION: THE MYTHS, THE REALITIES, AND
THE ARGUMENTS 24-27 (1970) (asserting that twins are individuals even before they are distinct from
one another), and PATRICK LEE, ABORTION AND UNBORN HUMAN LIFE 90-102 (1996) (refuting the

argument that as long as twinning can still occur all that exists is a mass of cells rather than an
individual). Obviously, all induced abortions, at whatever stage of pregnancy, occur well after
twinning and implantation in the uterine wall. Thus, although the issue is in need of resolution in
determining the moral and legal status of techniques such as in vitro fertilization, cloning and
embryonic experimentation and research, the matter is irrelevant to a proper moral and legal assessment
of partial birth abortion.
65 The State of Texas devoted a substantial portion of its brief to the Court in Roe to an exposition
of these basic facts of human development. See 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 227, 264-289 (Philip B. Kurland &

Gerhard Casper eds., 1973).
66Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). To simultaneously recognize both the humanity of the
unborn child and the right to kill that child would lead to an internal collapse similar to the one suffered
by Kurtz. Blackmun could not fashion a principle capable of reconciling these two propositions. To
avoid such an intellectual collapse in the opinion, Blackmun simply denied the humanity of the unborn
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no genuine dispute with respect to the science of when human life begins,
in order to vindicate the right to abortion, the Roe court was compelled to
invent a controversy where none in fact existed. Thus, the Court referred
to "the theory that a new human life is present from the moment of
conception" 67 and "the belief that life begins at conception." 68 Although
Blackmun makes frequent mention of "potential life," 9 "potential human
life, 70 and "the potentiality of human life,"71 he deliberately avoids
engaging the medical literature that addresses the question of when a
human being first comes into existence. Blackmun knew well the lesson
that Breyer would later follow: some things really are better left unsaid.
Blackmun's reticence was, however, quite selective.
Despite
Blackmun's apparent need to provide a seemingly-comprehensive history
of abortion from antiquity to the present 72 in an opinion exceeding fifty
pages, he was content to make a single, oblique reference to "the wellknown facts of fetal development"7 3 without elaboration. These facts, it
seems, were so well-known they could safely be ignored.
Having established the existence of a dispute, at least rhetorically, it
then suited Blackmun's purposes to declare the matter insoluble:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life
begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at
any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development
of man's74knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer.
Of course, it would not have been necessary "to speculate as to the answer"
of when human life begins had the Court bothered to consult "those trained
in the .. . discipline[] of medicine." The Court failed to do precisely that.
Instead, Blackmun's only reference to the medical profession is a skewed
history of the American Medical Association's (AMA) policy with respect
to the permissibility of abortion. That is, Blackmun notes that the AMA
adopted a policy favoring restrictive abortion laws in 1857 in order to
protect "the independent and actual existence of the child before birth, as a

child. Of course, where some fear to tread, others are all too happy to leap into the abyss. See PETER
SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1993); MICHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE (1983);

Wolf, supra note 9.
67Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.
68i.
69
70

Id. at 150, 154.
Id.at 159.

7'Id. at 162.
72 See id.at 129-47.
73
Id. at 156.

74Id.at 159.
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living being"7 5 and that the AMA revised its policy in 1970 in response to
certain "changes in state laws and by the judicial decisions which tend to
make abortion more freely available. 76 Blackmun fails to note, however,
that during the intervening period there was no change in the medical
conclusion that the victim of abortion is a living human being. The only
change in judgment was political in nature, not medical.
Confronting a question which he insisted did not have an answer,
Blackmun could then assume a posture of judicial modesty. 77 Indeed, by
not speculating as to "this most sensitive and difficult question" 78 he could
portray the Court as exercising restraint in the service of freedom. The
state, said Blackmun, could not restrict the pregnant woman's freedom of
choice "by adopting one theory of life." 7 9 Employing Kurtz's strategy,
Blackmun sought to resolve the matter by decisively acting "without
judgment."
There is, of course, nothing modest in pretending that science has not
resolved the answer to a particular scientific question when in fact it has.
And there is nothing restrainedin ignoring the conclusions of the medical
profession that represent the exercise of medical judgment simply in order
to reach a particular result. There is, however, something plainly ludicrous
in suggesting that a judge can decide a case without judging. 80 Just as
Kurtz's jungle fighters exercise judgment in their murderous use of
violence, so the Court's prohibition against adopting a "theory of life"
constitutes a judgment-a judgment that human life worthy of protection
begins only after birth, a judgment that under the Constitution one member
of the human family may be violently sacrificed at the altar of autonomy in
order to vindicate the "dignity" of another.
In declaring that the state must, as a constitutional matter, ignore the
humanity of the victim subject to abortion, the Court in Roe abandoned
both the principle of equal concern and respect and the principle of ordered
liberty in favor of the idea of liberty as license. This license, as Casey said,
includes "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life," even if the process of
self-definition entails extinguishing the life of another. 81 Stenberg lays
7

1d. at 141.

76

1d. at 143.

77 This conceit is still very much in evidence among Blackmun's successors. See STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5-6 (2005) (championing

"judicial modesty" as a means of helping "a community of individuals democratically find practical
solutions to important contemporary social problems").
78 Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
" Id.at 162.
80 Cf McConnell, supra note 14 at 1198 ("Society has no choice but to decide to whom it will
extend protection. It is not helpful to call this decision 'private,' for there is no more inherently
political question than the definition of the political community.").
81Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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bare the full implications of this license. The Stenberg court does not
trouble itself with Roe's fatuous claim that it "need not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins. ' 2 The majority knows that the life at issue in
the case has already begun. Indeed, it is in the process of being born. By
embracing what it believes is a maximal conception of human freedom, the
Court licenses the brutal killing of what is undeniably an innocent human
being. Turning its back on civilization, the Court marches proudly into the
jungle.
Accordingly, Stenberg makes apparent, as never before, the absurd
contradiction that the Court has placed at the foundation of our legal
system. This absurdity derives from the fact that the Court still routinely
invokes the language of human dignity and the sanctity of human life.83
Indeed, these invocations appear scattered throughout the Court's reported
decisions. Thus, for example, in striking down the Texas anti-sodomy
statute in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court informed us that it would "demean
the[] existence" of homosexuals if the state could "control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime." 4 Likewise, the Court
recently held that the State of Hawaii could not limit those eligible to vote
for a state-wide office to people of Hawaiian ancestry because "it demeans
the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his
or her own merit and essential qualities.' ' 5 Similarly, a generation ago, in
Cohen v. California, the Court held that the state could not prosecute a
man for wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft"
because such a restriction on free expression would not "comport with the
premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system
rests. 86
The point is not that these cases do not involve difficult questions of
human dignity-of freedom and equality. The point, instead, is that from
the juxtaposition of these cases with Stenberg we are led to believe that
restrictions on speech, sexual conduct, and voting are offensive to human
dignity, but that human dignity is not at issue in the case of partial birth
abortion-or rather, that human dignity requires the state not to interfere
with the brutal murder of a child in the process of being born. Thus,
2 Roe, 419 U.S. at 159.
8' See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). In rejecting the Ninth Circuit's use
of the "mystery passage" from Casey to fashion a constitutional right to assisted suicide, the Supreme
Court held that the state "has an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life." Id. at 728
(citation omitted). Indeed, the Court relied on the observation contained in the Model Penal Code that
"the interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by
one who expresses a willingness to participate in taking the life of another." Id. at 728-29. This
interest includes "protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly, and disabled
persons-from abuse, neglect, and mistakes." Id. at 731.
84 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
85Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000).
86Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
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although the language of human dignity, of equal concern and respect, still
lingers on in precedent, and the Court continues to mouth these words in
new decisions, the meaning of equality based on a common humanity is
gone. When read against the background of Stenberg v. Carhart,each of
these references to human dignity can be seen for what it is: a hollow
declaration that decency and civility still reign, that barbarism does not
define us, that we are not in the jungle. Some people, however, can still
read a map. The unadorned facts that underlie Stenberg remind us where
we are.
References to human dignity and the value of human life are especially
common in the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and in particular
its review of capital punishment. Here, the Court has repeatedly set forth
its belief that "[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less that the dignity of man., 87 Indeed, Justice William Brennan,
perhaps the most forceful proponent of this view, insisted that "[a]
punishment is cruel and unusual ...if it does not comport with human
dignity., 88 For Brennan, the "true significance" of such "barbaric
punishments" as the rack, the thumb-screw, and the death penalty itself "is
that they treat members of the human race as non-humans, as objects to be
toyed with and discarded. 8 9 As such, these acts are "inconsistent with the
fundamental premise" of our law "that even the vilest
criminal remains a
90
human being possessed of common human dignity.,
During his tenure on the Court, Justice Brennan was an unwavering
supporter of the abortion license. Although it is surely to Brennan's credit
that he could still perceive the fundamental human dignity of a violent
criminal, it is more than a little ironic that, in the case of abortion, he
approved of the treatment of "members of the human race as non-humans,
as objects to be toyed with and discarded." 9' Beyond irony, it is absurd
that our law acknowledges the "common human dignity" of a violent
criminal but refuses to recognize this same dignity in an innocent child
struggling to be born.
This absurdity is even more pronounced when the holding in Stenberg
is juxtaposed with the panoply of federal and state efforts intended to
extend the protection of law to unborn children, to acknowledge them as
members of the human family. It is absurd for the law to make available to
87 Trop

v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).

88 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Carol Steiker, No, CapitalPunishment is Not Morally Required: Deterrence,
Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 771 (2005) (suggesting that Brennan's
concurrence in Furman is the "most prominent exposition" of the argument that the death penalty
violates human dignity).
'9Furman, 408 U.S. at 272-73.
90Id.at 273.
91Id.
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grieving parents a cause of action for wrongful death and loss of society
for the "death" of an unborn child caused by the negligence of another
when the Supreme Court has declared that it cannot resolve the difficult
question of when "life" begins.92 It is absurd for the law to allow for
individuals to be prosecuted for homicide for deliberating causing the
death of an unborn child when Roe and its progeny allow a woman to pay
her doctor to deliberately exterminate the same child.93 If Stenberg is
correct, if the unborn child has no legal standing up to and including the
time of birth, then it is difficult to make sense of federal statutes like the
Born-Alive Infants' Protection Act, 94 the Unborn Victims of Violence Act
("Laci and Conner's Law"),95 and similar measures.
In Apocalypse Now, an American photojournalist and follower of
Kurtz, played by Dennis Hopper, remarks that the Colonel is "clear in his
mind, but his soul is mad." After Stenberg, the same could truly be said of
American law, without exaggeration. The freedom of the autonomous self
to kill a child in the process of being born is not ordered liberty. It is the
disorder of liberty run amok. It embodies what Joseph Ratzinger recently
referred to as "a dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize anything
as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists solely of one's own ego and
desires. '' 96 Under this new regime, law is no longer the rational ordering of
human conduct in support of the common good. 97 It is the triumph of the
92 See, e.g., Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Mo. 1995) (wrongful death statute
allows recovery for death of nonviable fetus). For a survey of states that treat fetuses as persons under
wrongful death statutes, see Dena M. Marks, Person v. Potential: JudicialStruggles to Decide Claims
Arising from the Death of an Embryo or Fetus and Michigan 's Struggle to Settle the Question, 37
AKRON L. REv. 41, 53-70 (2004).
93See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 191 S.W.3d 52, 54-55 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a pre-viable
"unborn child is a person for purposes of first-degree murder" under a Missouri statute acknowledging
that life begins at conception).
94Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926 (codified at I U.S.C.A. § 8 (West 2005)).
9'Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West Supp. 2006)).
96 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Dean of the Coll. of Cardinals, Homily at Mass for the Election of

the Supreme Pontiff (Vatican trans., Apr. 18, 2005), http://www.ewtn.com/pope/words/conclave
_homily.asp.
97Among the various conceptions available, the "constitutive integral common good" represents
"the most traditional sense of the common good." Daniel P. Sulmasy, Four Basic Notions of the
Common Good, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 303, 306-07 (2001) ("This is what Aristotle meant when he said
man or people are political animals. St. Thomas said every man or every one of us is part of the
community, so that we belong to the community in virtue of what we are. The relationship of being in
the community is the value of the constitutive common good."). As Sulmasy further explains:
The constitutive common good refers to those more robust notions of the
common good that hold that being in a community of relationships with other
human beings is itself a good. Therefore, being in a relationship, being part of the
community, being part of each other is itself a good. It is a good that either partly or
completely desires what is the good for me. This means that part of my good is the
good of the community ....
Id.
See, e.g., Lee Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within
Constitutional Interpretation:Orginalism Grounded in the Central Western Philosophical Tradition,
28 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 909 (2005). For a rich discussion of the common good in what has
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strong over the weak. It is the legal extermination of certain members of
the human species deemed inconvenient by those in power.
As such, our law now embodies a kind of insanity. It is, as Willard
says of Kurtz, "broken up and ripped apart" on the inside, wavering toward
collapse. The law is insane because it cannot rationally affirm the dignity
and equal worth of every human being and at the same time sanction the
intentional killing of an innocent human being in the name of freedom.
Indeed, in the hierarchy of values, human freedom cannot trump innocent
human life since the right to life enjoys a kind of logical priority over every
other right.98 The freedom to live is a necessary condition to the
enjoyment of every other kind of freedom, including the freedom to define
the meaning and mystery of human life extolled in Casey.
Moreover, the desire to maximize freedom cannot be the criterion by
which a human being is excluded from the protection of the law as a
subject of equal concern and respect. Put another way, the recognition of a
human being as a legal person, as a rights-bearer, cannot be contingent on
the desire of someone else to act in a particular way. 99 Ordered liberty
demands that we tolerate the inconvenience of other people.
become a seminal work, see JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD (Scott
Fitzgerald trans., 1947).
98 For an explication of what is meant by "logical priority," see S.L. Hurley, Objectivity and
Disagreement, in MORALITY AND OBJECTIVITY: A TRIBUTE TO J. L. MACKIE 54, 55 (Ted Honderich
ed., 1985) ("in general, to say that one concept or set of concepts is logically prior to another is to say
that the latter is properly accounted for and understood in terms of the former and not vice versa;
someone could grasp the prior concept without grasping the concept understood in terms of it, but not
vice versa. To deny a claim of logical priority is to deny that someone could correctly understand one
without understanding the other."). Plainly, the right to life enjoys precisely this kind of logical
priority over every other right. See, e.g., Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
Declaration on Procured Abortion para. 11 (1974), http://www.rc.net/rcchurch/vatstmts/cdfabort.txt
("The first right of the human person is his life. He has other goods and some more precious, but this
one is fundamental-the condition of all the others. . ..
It does not belong to society, nor does it
belong to public authority in any form to recognize this right for some and not for others.").
Germany's Basic Law embodies this principle. It gives juridical expression to the logical priority
of the right to life. Indeed, as Donald Kommers observes, the German
Constitution must be interpreted in the light of public values derived from a reading
of the Basic Law as a whole and particularly from its list of guaranteed rights, a list
crowned by the inviolate principle of human dignity. ... The German Court has
also declared that these objective values arrange themselves in a hierarchy ....
Human dignity, according to the Court, is the Basic Law's supreme value the chief
manifestation of which is the right to life [including the right to life for the unborn].
Donald Kommers, The ConstitutionalLaw ofAbortion in Germany: Should Americans Pay Attention?,
10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 9 (1994) (stating that other rights "must give way when [they]
conflict[ ] with the prior right to life").
99This is the unfortunate argument put forth at some length in Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status
of the Propositionthat "Life Begins at Conception," 43 STAN. L. REV. 599 (1991). This approach to
the issue of constitutional personhood, which might fairly be described as the fallacy of "backing-in" to
the concept, makes the content of the category "person" contingent on the effect that the possible
inclusion of some members, (i.e. unborn children) will have on other privileged members (i.e. women
who wish to abort their pregnancies). See, e.g., id. at 601 (arguing that "the consequences of deeming a
fetus a person must be recognized as relevant to the decision of when (if ever) a fetus acquires this
status" and that "[b]ecause it establishes the point at which a woman's constitutional right may be
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Given humanity's remarkable capacity for compartmentalization,
rationalization and denial, the fundamental contradiction that now besets
American law does not mean that the collapse of our legal system is
imminent. Even those who are insane, like Kurtz, can manage to function
fairly well day-to-day. But, if Stenberg is not reversed, its continued
presence will mark the solidification of a deep-seated intellectual
incoherence in the law, an incoherence that will have a corrosive effect on
our legal system in myriad ways. Indeed, the longer we stay in the jungle,
the harder it will be to recall what authentic civilization looks like and to
imagine how it might be recovered.

At the beginning of the film, when Willard's commanders first order
him to kill Colonel Kurtz, Willard is incredulous.
He thinks he
understands the order, but is uncertain. Could they really mean for him to
murder a fellow American? And so he asks for clarification: "Terminate
the Colonel?"
The current appeal to the Supreme Court of the cases striking down the
federal ban on partial birth abortion 0 0 permits us to do the same. It allows
the American public to seek clarification. Could the Court have really
meant what it appeared to say in Stenberg v. Carhart? Did the Court really
mean to get out of the boat and wander into the jungle?
Specifically, this appeal allows the public to demand explicit answers
to a number of questions: Did the Court in Stenberg really mean to say that
the humanity of the entity subject to partial birth abortion is irrelevant to
the question of whether it comes within the ambit of the law's protection?
Did it really mean to say that the humanity of a child in the process of
being born is irrelevant to its status under the Constitution? If so, the
American public deserves to have that proposition stated with utter clarity.
Likewise, if the Court concedes that the victim of partial birth abortion
abridged, the determination of a fetus's personhood cannot be divorced from the constitutional interests
protected by that right"). Sadly, Rubenfeld is not the only advocate of abortion that has employed this
sort of argument. See Panel Discussion, Legislating Morality: Should Life be Defined?, in DEFINING
HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 335, 339 (M.W. Shaw & A.E. Daudera
eds., 1983) ("One of my own motivations in trying to make a distinction between 'human being' and
'person' was perhaps my desire for an outcome that would allow women to have abortions. Hence I
said to myself: 'My gosh, if this kind of distinction is not possible we can't have abortions. Therefore,
let's see if I can make another move that will give me the kind of outcome I want."' (statement of
Daniel Callahan)); Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's
ConstitutionalRights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection,95 YALE L.J. 599, 599 & n.1 (1986)
(arguing that "[t]he social determination of how the legal system should view the fetus should be
informed by a careful consideration of all potential implications" and that "[t]he legal status that society
chooses to confer upon the fetus is dependent upon the goals being pursued and the effect of such status
on competing
values").
100 See supra note 27.
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is indeed a "human being" but maintains that it is not a "person" under the
Constitution,' 0' then the Court must explain its criteria for constitutional
personhood. Indeed, if the categories of "human being" and "person" are
not coextensive, then the Court must explain why that is the case sincewith the notable exception of slavery' 2 -- our law has always regarded
them as such. Because law is a matter of public reason and not simply the
expression of individual will, the language of judges must be more honest
and forthright than the euphemistic orders of military commanders seeking
to avoid the dictates of their own conscience. A judge may not avoid the
dictates of the law in order to reach a result that he or she deems desirable.
If there are human beings who are not entitled to the protections afforded
by legal personhood, then it is incumbent on the Court to explain why this
is so without ambiguity.
Throughout its abortion jurisprudence the Court has clearly struggled
with its own legitimacy in attempting to justify the nearly absolute right it
created in Roe.'0 3 Indeed, a preoccupation with the Court's status as the
101The distinction between being a "human being" and being a "person" is a crucial one that
occupies an important place in the literature concerning the moral and legal status of abortion. See
LEE, supra note 64; Arthur Leff, The LeffDictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 1996-97
(1985) (discussing the legal definition of the term "alive"); H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Ontology of
Abortion, 84 ETHICS 217 (1974) (discussing the humanity of the fetus); Noonan, supra note 10; Mary
Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, 57 THE MONIST 43, 53-57 (1973). The
question presented in the text above is not meant to assume that all "human beings" are "persons"
under the Constitution. On the contrary, the question is intended to prompt an honest and intellectually
rigorous answer from the Supreme Court, an answer which here to date has been sorely lacking. For a
contemporary discussion of "personhood" that regards the concept as problematic and reflective of a
deep anxiety in law see, Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a
Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (2001), and Jens David Ohlin, Is the Concept of Person
Necessary for Human Rights?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (2005). For a particularly helpful discussion
of the meaning of "personhood," see Daniel Wikler, Concepts of Personhood."A Philosophical
Perspective, in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 99,

at 12.

102 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (holding that blacks, whether free or
slave, had "no rights which the white man was bound to respect"). Although far less dramatic in the
scope of its application, another notable exception is Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding the
forced sterilization of mentally handicapped individuals in state institutions). As noted in supra note
66, some have argued that even if the being in utero is recognized not only as a "human being" but as a
"person" who enjoys rights, abortion should still be permitted in any case. This argument was most
famously put forth in Judith Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). See also
Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979) (applying Thomson's thesis
in the context of American constitutional law). Originally Lawrence Tribe rejected Thomson's
argument as "interesting but problematic." See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1348 n.76 (2nd ed. 1988); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 926 n.44 (I st
ed. 1978). Nevertheless, in his book on abortion, Tribe enthusiastically embraced Thomson's argument
without explaining why her reasoning was no longer "problematic." See TRIBE, supra note 58, at 135
(concluding that the Roe court could have said that "[e]ven if the fetus is a person, our Constitution
forbids compelling a woman to carry it for nine months and become a mother").
103See e.g., Ely, supra note 59 at 947 (concluding that Roe is "a very bad decision ....
It is bad
because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no
sense of an obligation to try to be"). Still, the effort to justify the substance of the Court's decision in
Roe and the constitutional role it entails continues. For a recent, interesting contribution to the
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ultimate source of constitutional meaning-and not the merits of the
case-was largely responsible for the Court's decision in Casey.1°4
Answering the questions described above would require the Court to
honestly confront the role it has assumed within our republic and the
sources of authority that make the exercise of that power legitimate under
the Constitution.
But honesty is always accompanied by risk. Fearful that a thorough
and intellectually honest response to these questions would expose the true
nature of the Court's decision and threaten the Court's stature as an
institution, Breyer and the other signatories to Stenberg may simply be
incapable of this sort of candor. Still, no matter how awkward it might be
for the Justices to answer these questions in a manner free of obfuscation,
it is not impertinent for us to insist that they do so. The rule of law
requires as much. Indeed, the rule of law not only requires the Court to
answer these questions directly, it also requires the Court to demonstrate,
as best it can, that the Constitution demands the answers it puts forth.' °5
In Stenberg v. Carhartthe Supreme Court "got out'a the fucking boat"
and led us into the jungle. With partial birth abortion once more before the
Court, we again stand at the water's edge. The jungle lies only a few steps
away, and seeing now only dimly the outlines and shadows that mark it,
the freedom it promises is powerfully enticing. Thus, the Court and the
scholarly literature, see WHAT ROE v. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S ToP LEGAL EXPERTS
REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack Balkin ed., 2005).
104 For

example, Michael Stokes Paulsen argues that "Casey is not much concerned with [the

abortion] question at all. Casey is concerned with the question of how overruling Roe might affect the
public's perception of the Court's legitimacy and its claimed right to 'speak before all others for their
constitutional ideals."' Paulsen, supra note 17 at 680. Indeed, "Casey is, in other words, concerned not
with what the Constitution says, but with what people might think of their High Priests in black robes.
For these reasons, and no other stated ones, the Court in Casey adhered to Roe, 'whether or not
mistaken."' Id.
''In Planned Parenthoodof Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Court provided its
articulation of this principle:
The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and
perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to
determine what the Nation's law means and to declare what it demands. The
underlying substance of this legitimacy is of course the warrant for the Court's
decisions in the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal principle on which the
Court draws. That substance is expressed in the Court's opinions, and our
contemporary understanding is such that a decision without principled justification
would be no judicial act at all. But even when justification is furnished by apposite
legal principle, something more is required. Because not every conscientious claim
of principled justification will be accepted as such, the justification claimed must be
beyond dispute. The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow
people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded
truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as
such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus,
the Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under
circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be
accepted by the Nation.
Id. at 865-66.
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people it serves must decide: Do we turn our backs on civilization and
head further into the bush, embracing the illusion of freedom in the
barbarous license of state-sanctioned killing? Or do we turn once more to
recognize the fundamental dignity of every human being, the equal dignity
which informs ordered liberty and which makes authentic civilization
possible? In pondering our response, without a doubt, the best advice that
can be had comes from a film about violence and morality, candor and the
tenuous nature of civilization: Never get out'a the boat!
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